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ARTICLES
PRICE-FIXING, PRIVITY, AND THE PASS-ON PROB-
LEM IN ANTITRUST TREBLE-DAMAGES SUITS:
A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
JOHN CIRACE*
More than sixty years after the New York Court of Appeals re-
jected privity of contract as a defense in products liability cases,, the
United States Supreme Court permitted a defendant in an antitrust
treble-damages suit to assert lack of privity against an ultimate con-
sumer of the defendant's product.2 Although the Court's decision in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 3 produces results that inadequately har-
monize the conflicting goals of the antitrust laws, the elimination of
these problems will require congressional, rather than judicial, ac-
tion. The most appropriate means of legislatively balancing the in-
compatible antitrust policies, however, has not been considered ade-
quately.
In Illinois Brick the state of Illinois, on behalf of 700 various gov-
ernmental entities, brought an action under section 4 of the Clayton
* B.A., Harvard College; J.D., Stanford University; Ph.D., Columbia Uni-
versity. Assistant Professor of Economics, Herbert H. Lehman College of the City
University of New York. The author wishes to thank Professor Donald Dewey
of Columbia University for his helpful suggestions and criticism.
1. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). For a
history of the cases leading to the breakdown of the privity rule in product
liability see E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (1948); H.
BERMAN & W. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 482-504 (3d ed.
1972).
2. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (19-77).
3. Id.
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Act 4 alleging that price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act 5 by
concrete block manufacturers caused illegal overcharges in the prices
of public buildings. The plaintiffs wanted to demonstrate that the
illegal overcharge ultimately passed to them through masonry con-
tractors and general contractors. In response, the defendants moved
for partial summary judgment on the ground that, as a matter of law,
only direct purchasers had standing to sue antitrust violators. The dis-
trict court granted their motion 7 but the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that indirect purchasers were en-
titled to prove any injury in fact.8 Thus, the Seventh Circuit joined
the Second 9 and Ninth 10 Circuits in allowing plaintiffs to use pass-on
theory to show that injuries accruing from antitrust violations passed
to them through intermediate purchasers with and without privity.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari " to resolve a conflict among
the courts of appeals 12 over the validity of the offensive use of pass-on
theory.'3 In its opinion the Court, through Justice White, recognized
that it had two alternatives: to overrule or narrowly confine to its
4. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
5. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides in pertinent
part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. .. ."
6. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
7. Id. at 467-68. The defendants had entered into a pre-trial consent decree,
United States v. Ampress Brick Co., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,060 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
which, unlike a final judgment or decree of guilt following a criminal or civil
trial, is not prima facie evidence of a violation of the antitrust laws in a subse-
quent treble-damages action. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). For text of § 16(a) see
note 34 infra.
8. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976).
9. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971).
10. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
11. 429 U.S. 938 (1976).
12. Compare cases cited notes 8-10 supra with Mangano v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g per curiam
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
13. 431 U.S. at 728.
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facts Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,14 which
invalidated the pass-on defense, or to preclude the plaintiffs from
recovering on their pass-on theory.15 In Hanover Shoe the plaintiff
shoe manufacturer brought a treble-damages action against United
Shoe, which had monopolized the shoe machinery market with a lease-
only policy. United Shoe attempted to defend on the ground that the
plaintiff, by virtue of an inelastic demand for its product, had been
able to pass the illegal overcharge to its customers.", Hanover Shoe re-
jected the pass-on defense17 for two reasons: first, the Court was
unwilling to complicate the "already protracted" 18 antitrust treble-
damages actions with theoretical attempts to trace the effects of the
illegal overcharge through the chain of production and distribution; 19
second, the Court concluded that allowing direct purchasers to sue
would prevent antitrust violators from "retain[ing] the fruits of
their illegality" 20 whereas indirect purchasers, with little stake in
the outcome, would have less incentive to sue the wrongdoers.21
Hanover Shoe's elimination of the pass-on-defense and the Court's
initial determination in Illinois Brick that the pass-on rule must apply
equally to plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust treble-damages ac-
tions 22 foreclosed the offensive use of pass-on theory. Thus, Illinois
Brick held that only direct purchasers could sue antitrust violators
and that subsequent purchasers, lacking privity of contract, were pre-
cluded from proving that an illegal overcharge was passed to them.23
In addition to the stare decisis problem presented by Hanover Shoe,
the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick attempted to balance several rele-
vant antitrust law policies. These policies included compensating in-
jured parties, 24 deterring antitrust violations, 2 5 protecting defendants
from multiple liability,- and defining a manageable legal stand-
14. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
15. 431 U.S. at 736.
16. 392 U.S. at 491-92.
17. Id. at 492.
18. 431 U.S. at 732.
19. 392 U.S. at 492-93.
20. Id. at 494.
21. Id.
22. 431 U.S. at 728.
23. Id. at 735-36.
24. Id. at 737-41.
25. Id. at 745-47.
26. Id. at 735. After Hanover Shoe rejected the defensive use of pass-on theory,
many commentators, aware of the potential multiple liability of antitrust de-
fendants, proposed procedural solutions to the problem. See, e.g., McGuire, The
Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble
Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 177 (1971); Comment, Stand-
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ard.2 7 Total accommodation of these conflicting policies, however, is
virtually impossible. Compensating injured parties, for example, often
is incompatible with a manageable legal standard because of theoreti-
cal problems in the economic analysis of a damage award. In a pass-on
situation, this analysis is complicated further because a monopolistic
overcharge has cumulatively larger effects as it occurs farther back
in the chain of production and distribution. Similarly, the practical
problem of measuring the injuries plaintiffs suffer in specific in-
stances is nearly insoluble. 2 If courts emphasize deterrence, how-
ever, the remedy should be available to the party best able to assert
it; thus, deterrence is not necessarily compatible with compensation.
If the protection of defendants from multiple liability and the defi-
nition of a manageable legal standard are primary concerns, that is, if
courts follow a privity rule, compensation and deterrence assuredly
will suffer.
Notwithstanding the problems presented by these conflicting poli-
cies, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick have left antitrust law in an un-
fortunate state. A thesis of this Article is that the absolute privity
rule inadequately balances the goals of the antitrust laws and that
Congress, by legislation, should limit the rule's applicability in a man-
ner that harmonizes the relevant policies more sufficiently. By com-
bining practical considerations of antitrust enforcement as reflected
in several pre-Illinois Brick lower court decisions considering the
pass-on issue 29 with conclusions drawn from general economic prin-
ing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, .123 U. PA. L.
REV. 976 (1975). See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 74-76 (2d ed. 1974);
Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-On Doc-
trine, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 98 (1972); Comment, The Defense of "Passing On" in
Treble Damage Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE L.J. 469 (1961).
27. 431 U.S. at 741-45.
28. Richard Posner has argued that a simple damages remedy is insufficient
because many antitrust violations are concealable:
Ideally, the damages award in an antitrust case should equal the
social costs of the violation divided by the probability of apprehension
and successful prosecution .... [T]he treble-damage remedy is too
rigid. It overdeters in cases where the probability of punishment is
higher than 33 percent and underdeters in cases where the proba-
bility is lower. The multiple applied to the actual damages should be
permitted to vary depending on the particular circumstances of the
case.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 361 (1972).
29. Pass-on case law is analogous to the products liability decisions that
followed MacPherson v. Buick's rejection of the privity defense. See generally
R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed. 1974);
P. KEETON & M. SHAPO, PRODUCTS AND THE CONSUMER: DEFECTIVE AND DANGER-
OUS PRODUCTS (1970) ; D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL
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ciples, Congress can identify plaintiffs for whom preferred, but not
exclusive, standing in treble-damages actions should be granted,
regardless of privity. As a first step in this analysis, the Article dis-
tinguishes the pass-on problem from the related direct-indirect, target
area, and speculative damage problems. This discussion is followed
by a presentation of the textbook economic theory of the pass-on prob-
lem, which is neither novel nor controversial. The interesting question,
however, is the role, if any, that economic theory should play in anti-
trust litigation. Justice White, writing for the Court in both Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick, has addressed this issue; Professor Schaefer
has expressed a contrary position.30 Because their analyses present
two extremes, neither of which satisfactorily resolves the complica-
tions inherent in antitrust litigation, an alternative theory is proposed.
Applying this alternative theory to legal and economic realities
necessitates an analysis of the treatment courts have afforded the
pass-on issue. Thus, the Article examines several lower court cases
decided before Illinois Brick that deemed privity as irrelevant to an
appropriate resolution of the pass-on problem. This analysis leads to
several conclusions that are worthy of congressional consideration:
first, when price-fixing has occurred at any vertical level in the chain
of production of goods that are specially constructed for and con-
tracted by the buyer, he should be granted standing to sue for treble
damages, despite his lack of privity with the manufacturer ;31 second,
when price-fixing by final product manufacturers has occurred
in the vertical chain of production and distribution of mass-
produced goods, wholesalers may be able to pass-on the overcharge
and therefore are inappropriate plaintiffs in treble-damages suits
notwithstanding their privity with the price-fixers; 32 third, when
price-fixing in the vertical chain of mass-produced goods has occurred
(1974). Those cases dealt effectively with the issue of which firms in a vertical
chain of production and distribution would be liable for physical harm caused by
unavoidable defects in products. For example, in a case in which an airplane
crashed because of a defective altimeter, the manufacturer of the completed
airplane, rather than the altimeter manufacturer, was held liable for reasons of
social policy: the manufacturer of the completed product usually has a deeper
pocket than the component manufacturer and may spread the risk more easily,
see Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). Subsequent cases established that the component manu-
facturer also may be held liable. See, e.g., B. K. Sweeney Co. v. McQuay-Norris
Mfg. Co., 30 Colo. App. 134, 489 P.2d 356 (1971); Penker Constr. Co. v. Finley,
485 S.W.2d 244 (Ky. 1972).
30. See Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 883 (1975).
31. See notes 76-100 infra & accompanying text.
32. See notes 101-09 infra & accompanying text.
1977]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
below the level of the final product, standing to sue should be granted
to the manufacturer of the final product.3 "
PASS-ON IN PRICE-FIXING CASES DISTINGUISHED FROM DIRECT-
INDIRECT, TARGET AREA, AND SPECULATIVE DAMAGE PROBLEMS
In suits to recover treble damages for price-fixing, proving a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws often is easy because section 5 (a) of the
Clayton Act :4 provides that a final judgment 35 for the government
in an antitrust action is prima facie eVidence against the defendant
in subsequent actions by other plaintiffs. Similarly, the amount of
damages, by antitrust standards, is relatively specific 31 and reason-
ably ascertainable. It is measured by the difference between actual
and "competitive" prices multiplied by the number of units bought.
Prior to the establishment of the Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
privity requirements, courts could consider evidence identifying the
level or levels in the vertical chain of production and distribution
that had suffered injury, and the extent of such injury. Pass-on theory
in these cases could be used to determine the proper distribution of
the damage award. Plaintiffs could use the concept offensively to
demonstrate that the injury from illegal overcharges was passed to
them by intermediate purchasers. Moreover, defendants could attempt
33. See notes 120-25 infra & accompanying text.
34. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), provides in
pertinent part:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has
violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such de-
fendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws..., as to all matters respect-
ing which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between
the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to
consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has
been taken ....
35. A plea of nolo contendere, which can be made only with the court's con-
sent, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, falls within the consent judgment exception to § 5 (a)
of the Clayton Act, see note 34 supra, and therefore is unavailable as prima
facie evidence against the defendant in a subsequent antitrust action. See Bur-
bank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 833-35 (9th Cir. 1964).
36. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 25 (1973); Handler &
Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae
and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 655-60 (1976); Lanzillotti,
Problems of Proof of Damages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 329
(1971); Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The
Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1210 (1968).
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to prove that their direct purchasers suffered no injury, having passed
the initial overcharge, in turn, to their customers.
The pass-on problem in price-fixing cases is distinguishable from
the question presented in an antitrust action brought by a plaintiff
who is outside the vertical chain of production but who claims through
a party in the chain. Such a situation, known as the direct-indirect
problem, first occurred in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.37 In Loeb the
plaintiff was a stockholder and creditor of a corporation that was
forced into bankruptcy by a price-fixing conspiracy. He sued to re-
cover treble damages, alleging as injuries the loss of his stock and the
inability to enforce his claim against the defunct corporation. Noting
that the conspiracy was directed at the corporation, however, the
Third Circuit held that stockholders and creditors suffered only in-
direct or consequential injuries.38 Concerned with the need to limit
the possibility of multiple suits arising from a single antitrust viola-
tion, the court determined that the corporation was the proper party
to protect the rights of its stockholders.3 9 Such a result is appropriate
when the person, entity, or class designated to bring the antitrust
action has incentive to do so and when the damages award ultimately
will be allocated properly between the suing party and those claiming
through it because of their business relationship.
The rationale of Loeb has been applied in other direct-indirect situa-
tions. For example, persons working for firms against whom antitrust
violations are alleged have been denied standing to sue.4 0 Lessors have
been unable to sue for decreased rental payments caused by antitrust
violations that have affected their lessees' businesses adversely. 41
Courts also have prevented patent licensors, 42 materials suppliers, 43
and, apparently, franchisors 44 from suing for economic losses caused
37. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
38. Id. at 709.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Contra, Data Digests,
Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
41. See, e.g., Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.
1964); Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 890 (1956).
42. SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 943 (1969); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d
678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
43. Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe
Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
44. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970); Nation-
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by antitrust violations directed at the businesses of their licensees,
customers, or franchisees.
Also distinguishable from pass-on problems in price-fixing litiga-
tions are "target area" cases in which plaintiffs in vertically affected
markets have no privity with any party in the vertical chain of produc-
tion. For example, in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.45 the de-
fendant oil company required independent service station operators
selling its petroleum products to enter into exclusive dealing contracts
for the sale of certain automobile accessories sponsored by the de-
fendant. As plaintiff, Karseal alleged that the service station opera-
tors would have purchased its automobile polish if they had not been
bound by the exclusive contracts. Although neither in the vertical
chain of production nor claiming through a party in the vertical chain,
Karseal was in a vertical market affected by the defendant's illegal
conduct. The Ninth Circuit characterized the issue of Karseal's ability
to sue for treble damages by asking whether the plaintiff was "within
the 'target area' of Richfield's illegal practices ... ? Assuming Karseal
was 'hit' by the effect of the Richfield antitrust violations, was Kar-
seal 'aimed at' with enough precision to entitle it to maintain a
treble damage suit under the Clayton Act?" 46
This "rifle range" test is difficult to apply in different fact situa-
tions, but it reflects the general concern that injuries caused by illegal
conduct not specifically directed at the particular plaintiff are specu-
lative. Moreover, a lenient grant of standing to parties outside the
vertical chain of production could create virtually unlimited liability
for some antitrust defendants. Such a result would introduce an ele-
ment of overkill into the Clayton Act's policy promoting private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws.4 7
wide Auto Appraiser Serv. Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925
(10th Cir. 1967).
45. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
46. Id. at 362.
47. See note 4 supra. See generally International Rys. of Cent. America v.
United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The target area
test has been adopted by the Second Circuit. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 930 (1972). One court has rephrased the target area test by inquiring
whether the plaintiff's injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's illegal conduct. Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th
Cir. 1970). The inquiry of another court considered whether a company's in-
juries were arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute.
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975). For a general
discussion of the antitrust standing problem see Sherman, Antitrust Standing:
From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 374 (1976).
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A third area distinguishable from pass-on theory, which primarily
is concerned with the proper distribution of the damage award, in-
volves the problem of quantifying the actual injuries. Damages are
ascertained most easily in situations in which buyers are forced to
pay illegal overcharges. Such overcharges result when the defendants
have engaged in price-fixing or discrimination or have required their
customers to enter into tying or reciprocity agreements. The measure-
ment of damages becomes more speculative when the injured parties
include foreclosed competitors. This situation might arise when a tying
agreement contained a provision for exclusive dealing, thus creating
the target area problem confronted by the court in Karseal.48 Com-
petitors also may be eliminated illegally in circumstances involving
boycotts, monopolies, and horizontal territorial division agreements.
Finally, when the antitrust violation involves an illegal merger or gen-
eral injury to the economy, the amount of damages is most uncertain.49
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The purpose of pass-on theory, then, is to ascertain the most ap-
propriate allocation of an antitrust treble-damages award among
various purchasers in the vertical chain of production and distribu-
tion. The next inquiry attempts to determine the extent to which eco-
nomic analysis properly might aid courts in antitrust litigation. An
understanding of the economic theory of the pass-on problem is a
prerequisite to this discussion.
The Economic Theory of the Pass-on Problem
The economic complexities of the pass-on problem 50 are illustrated
by a price-fixing hypothetical. Assume that the chain of production of
a particular product comprises three vertically related industries. For
example, industry 1 consists of ball bearing manufacturers; industry
2 consists of wheel manufacturers; and industry 3 consists of auto-
mobile manufacturers. Assume also that industries 2 and 3, the inter-
mediate and final product manufacturers, have competitive economic
structures and that industry 1, which is in the form of a monopoly,
48. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
49. See, e.g., Handler & Blechman, supra note 36, at 655-60. See generally
Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Remedies, 89 HAav. L. REV. 1127
(1976); Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage
Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 691 (1963).
50. For discussions of this topic see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 389-91 (10th
ed. 1976); M. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 346-50 (2d ed. 1974); R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST 147-49 (1974).
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conspiracy, or cartel, is capable of selling ball bearings at monopoly
prices to the wheel manufacturers. The economic issue presented is
whether and to what extent the wheel manufacturers can pass the
monopolistic overcharge 51 to the automobile manufacturers. Its solu-
tion depends upon the relative elasticities 52 of the industrial supply
and demand for wheels.
The significance of demand and supply elasticities can be demon-
strated by three theoretical cases, two extreme and one general. In
terms of the hypothetical described above, one extreme case exists if
demand for wheels is totally inelastic (Case 1A) or if the supply of
wheels is totally elastic (Case 1B). If the demand for wheels is totally
inelastic, automobile manufacturers will purchase the same quantity of
wheels regardless of price. If the supply of wheels is totally elastic,
wheel manufacturers will supply at a given price all that the market
demands and nothing at a lower price. In both situations, wheel manu-
facturers, as intermediate purchasers, can pass the entire illegal over-
charge to automobile manufacturers. 53
51. The illegal overcharge resulting from price-fixing is equivalent to a unit
tax and can be analyzed in terms of tax incidence theory. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE,
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE ch. 13 (1959); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE chs. 16, 20 (2d ed. 1976); C. SHOUP,
PUBLIC FINANCE ch. 10 (1969).
52. Elasticity can be defined as the ratio of the percentage change in quantity
demanded or supplied to the percentage change in 'price. See M. SPENCER, supra
note 50, at 340.
53. This conclusion can be demonstrated by the following illustrations:
CASE 1A (inelastic demand) CASE 1B (elastic supply)
Price D/ S Price D
P after A P after A S
P before B P before BS
Q Quantity Quantity
In both diagrams, supply curve S represents the wheel industry's supply prior
to the monopolistic overcharge on ball bearings, and supply curve S' represents
the industry's supply curve after the monopolistic overcharge is instituted. The
effect of the overcharge is to shift the industry supply curve vertically by AB,
the amount of the overcharge per unit. When demand (D) for an intermediate
product is totally inelastic, as in Case 1A, consumers of that product will pur-
chase quantity OQ regardless of price. The price after the overcharge, P after, is
[Vol. 19:171
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The opposite theoretical extreme (Case 2) would be presented when
the demand for wheels was totally elastic. In Case 2 automobile manu-
facturers would buy all wheels offered at a specific price and nothing
at a higher price. As a result, wheel manufacturers could not pass any
of the overcharge to automobile manufacturers . 4
These extreme illustrations, however, rarely exist within a situation
involving vertically related industries, such as the present hypo-
thetical. In the general case (Case 3), which reflects economic reality
more accurately, neither demand nor supply are completely elastic or
inelastic. As a result, some of the overcharge must be borne by the
wheel manufacturers and some will be passed to the automobile manu-
facturers. Similar to the extreme cases, the burdens allocable to each
industry will depend on the relative elasticities of supply and demand
higher than the price before, P before, by the entire amount of the overcharge,
AB which is passed to the purchasers of the intermediate product.
If an intermediate product's supply curve is totally elastic, as in Case 1B, the
manufacturers of that product will supply all that the market desires (D) at a
price of P before and nothing at a lower price. The price rises by the total
amount of the overcharge, which therefore is passed to the purchasers of the
intermediate product. Theoretically, the reduced quantity sold in Case IB, unlike
Case 1A, could place a burden on the intermediate product manufacturers. See
M. SPENCER, supra note 50, at 348.
54. In Case 2 assume that the wheel industry's supply curve shifts from S to S'
by the amount of the monopolistic overcharge, AB.
CASE 2
SY
Price S
P b+a D
B
Quantity
The diagram represents a totally elastic demand (D) for wheels; therefore
automobile manufacturers will buy all the wheels offered at price P b+ a and
nothing at a higher price. Because the price that wheel manufacturers will re-
ceive for their product will not reflect the monopolistic overcharge, this industry
must bear the entire burden of the antitrust violation. Although the selling price
does not rise, the reduced quantity supplied theoretically could place a burden on
the automobile manufacturers. See id.
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for wheels.55 Although many factors influence these elasticities, eco-
nomists, recognizing four general principles, have determined that the
demand for a component part of a final product will be less elastic as
decreases occur: in the final product's elasticity of demand, in the
proportion of the final product's total cost accounted for by that
component, in the number of substitutes available for that component,
and in the substitute components' elasticity of supply.56
Returning to the hypothetical, if wheel manufacturers can pass at
least some of the illegal overcharge to automobile manufacturers, a
similar analysis must be employed to determine whether automobile
manufacturers can pass the overcharge through the chain of distri-
bution to retailers and, ultimately, to consumers.5 The analysis be-
55. In the general case neither demand (D) nor supply are totally elastic or
inelastic. Assume that supply shifts from S to S' by the amount of the over-
charge, AB:
CASE 3
Price 'S
P after A
P before
Quantity
The per unit price paid by automobile manufacturers after the overcharge,
P after, is higher than the price before, P before, but only by AC, which is less
than the full amount of the monopolistic overcharge, AB. As a result, the wheel
manufacturers must absorb BC of the overcharge. See G. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE 17 (rev. ed. 1952).
56. See 5 A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS ch. 6 (8th ed. 1925); M.
SPENCER, supra note 50, at 449; G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 243 (3d ed.
1966).
57. See, e.g., Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438
F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g per curiam Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), in which
manufacturers of plumbing fixtures engaged in price fixing. In dicta the district
court considered whether an overcharge paid by wholesalers was passed succes-
sively to the plumbing contractors, the general contractors, and, ultimately, the
original owners or even the second owners of homes and apartment buildings.
For a discussion of Mangano see text accompanying notes 126-130 infra.
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comes more complicated than that described above because a monopo-
listic overcharge will have cumulative effects as it occurs farther back
in the chain of production and distribution. After passing through
several stages, the cumulative effect of the overcharge on price per
unit may be less than, equal to, or even greater than the initial over-
charge.58 Unless subsequent stages of production and distribution are
perfectly competitive, however, the loss in the value of output at suc-
cessive stages t" is cumulatively larger, with the largest loss exper-
ienced at the stage selling the final product.60
Economic Pass-on Theory and Antitrust Litigation
Professor Schaefer has suggested that the pass-on problem in anti-
trust litigation can be resolved by statistical studies and expert testi-
58. If all the subsequent vertically related industries have curves as in Case 2,
the price to consumers will not be hiter than before the overcharge. If, how-
ever, all the subsequent stages have demand and supply curves that are neither
totally elastic nor inelastic, as in Case 3, the price will rise cumulatively as an
increase in one industry causes an upward shift in the supply curve and a
commensurate rise in the price of the next vertically related industry. If the
industry demand curves at subsequent stages are relatively elastic and market
imperfections are not large, the cumulative rises in price may amount to less
than the initial overcharge per unit. If market imperfections in subsequent
industries are substantial, the overcharge per unit that consumers pay will be
greater than the initial overcharge per unit. For example, successive monopolies
in vertically related stages will cause the final price to be higher and the output
lower than if only one monopoly existed in the chain of production and distribu-
tion. Nevertheless, monopoly profit will be lower: a single monopoly restricts
output and raises price so as to maximize profit; a further increase in price
caused by a monopoly at a subsequent stage unduly restricts output and there-
fore produces a reduction in the total profit extracted from consumers. The desire
to avoid multiple monopolies in the chain of production and distribution pro-
vides a powerful incentive for vertical integration. For discussions of the effects
of vertical integration see Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv.
L. REV. 27 (1949); McGee & Basset, Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 17 (1976); Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control with Variable Proportions,
82 J. PoL. ECON. 783 (1974).
59. Value of output can be measured as price times quantity sold. Thus, when
demand is completely elastic, as in Case 2, price does not rise; nevertheless, the
value of output decreases because the overcharge reduces the quantity sold.
60. See McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms, 61 ECON. J.
785 (1951). As proof of this statement, McKenzie states:
The simplest model . . . is perhaps that where lines of production
are isolated from one another but are built up of industries arranged
in successive stages. In each stage of production we may suppose
that the firms buy productive services from households and inter-
mediate products from the preceding stage. . . . [A]ssume that the
factors of production, including intermediate products, may be used in
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mony that will estimate the elasticities of demand and supply.,1 Under
this rationale, estimates would be necessary for each stage in the chain
of production and distribution, and economic theory would be expected
to provide a relatively accurate formula for distributing the damage
award. Applicable only on a case-by-case basis, Schaefer's position is
too simplistic, inasmuch as it suggests that applied economic theory
can provide realistic solutions to the pass-on and other problems in
antitrust litigation.
The Supreme Court has determined that analyses of economic
theories and elasticity studies cannot provide a fully satisfactory solu-
tion to antitrust problems. Thus, Hanover Shoe's rejection of the pass-
on defense manifested the Court's unwillingness to complicate treble-
variable proportions.
* * . [W]hen the combination of factors is variable, the value of the
marginal product of any factor bears the same proportion to the price
of the factor that the price of the product bears to the marginal cost.
Let us symbolise the average ratio of price to marginal cost in a
particular stage of production by r i, where i denotes the stage. Then
the withdrawal of a small quantity of a productive service from the
ith stage may be expected to reduce the value of the output of that
stage by r i times the cost of the services withdrawn. Symbolising the
cost of services withdrawn by w, the expected loss is ri x w. This
deprives the succeeding stage of intermediate product valued at
r i x w. Then by the same argument the decline in output in the
(i + 1) th stage will be ri+1 x r i x w. Therefore, if price exceeds
marginal cost in the subsequent stages of production, the loss in the
value of output at successive stages will be cumulatively larger, until
the largest loss of all is experienced in the stage producing the final
product.
1d. at 789-90.
In addition, the "dead weight" or "welfare loss" resulting from a monopolistic
overcharge has cumulatively larger effects at successive stages in the vertical
chain of production and distribution. These cumulative effects were suggested
to the author by Professor Donald Dewey. For discussions of "dead weight" and
"welfare loss" see C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS 287-92 (rev.
ed. 1974); W. VICKERY, MICROSTATIcS 285-88 (1964).
61. Professor Schaefer has stated:
Problems of proof do not present insurmountable obstacles to more
liberal standing for remote purchasers. The extent to which an over-
charge can be passed on depends upon the elasticity of demand and
the elasticity of supply in the market in which the direct purchaser
sells. Economists are quite capable of dealing with these subjects;
expert witnesses could use numerous statistical techniques that have
been developed to measure elasticities of demand and supply. Indeed,
estimates of elasticity of demand already have been developed in
other contexts for some of the final products the prices of which
may have been affected by recent price-fixing conspiracies.
Schaefer, supra note 30, at 915-16 (footnotes omitted).
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damages actions with theoretical attempts to trace the effects of an
illegal overcharge through subsequent purchasers in the chain of pro-
duction and distribution.6 2 Justice White stated his concern over the
introduction of economic intricacies into complex antitrust problems:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing poli-
cies. Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant
conditions cannot be measured after the fact .... Equally
difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than
an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change
in a company's price will have on its total sales .... Since
establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense
would require a convincing showing of . . . virtually unas-
certainable figures, the task would normally prove insur-
mountable. On the other hand, . . . if the existence of the
defense is generally confirmed, . . . [t] reble-damage ac-
tions would often require additional long and complicated
proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated
theories.63
The problems inherent in calculating the distribution of antitrust
damages through the application of economic models rendered the
pass-on defense inappropriate. Similar considerations prompted the
Court in Illinois Brick to reject the pass-on offense: 14
62. 392 U.S. at 492-93.
63. Id. (footnote omitted).
64. Courts and commentators have disagreed on whether Hanover Shoe evinced
an intention by the Supreme Court to establish an absolute privity requirement.
Compare Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 750-53 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) and Schaefer, supra note 30, at 930 n.195, with Balmac, Inc. v. American
Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. f 74,235, at 93,062 (N.D. Cal. 1972) and
Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 630-31 (D. Colo. 1971). The proposi-
tion derives support from Hanover Shoe's citation of several precedents, arising
under the transportation laws, which discussed the relationship between privity
and pass-on. 392 U.S. at 490 & n.8. The first of these was Southern Pac. Co. v.
Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918), in which a shipper sought to
enforce a reparations order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
against the defendant railroad. Responding to the defendant's argument that
the plaintiffs had suffered no injury because they had passed-on the overcharge,
the Court, through Justice Holmes, noted:
The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is
not to go beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote conse-
quences to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the
plaintiff has suffered a loss .... If it be said that the whole transac-
tion is one from a business point of view, it is enough to reply that
the unity in this case is not sufficient to entitle the purchaser to
recover, any more than the ultimate consumer who in turn paid an
increased price. He has no privity with the carrier.... The carrier
ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only one
who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation with
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Under an array of simplifying assumptions, economic
theory provides a precise formula for calculating how the
overcharge is distributed between the overcharged party
(passer) and its customers (passees) .... Even if these as-
sumptions are accepted, there remains a serious problem
of measuring the relevant elasticities .... In view of the diffi-
culties that have been encountered, even in informal ad-
versary proceedings, with the statistical techniques used to
estimate these concepts, . . . it is unrealistic to think that
elasticity studies introduced by expert witnesses will resolve
the pass-on issue.6 5
him .... Behind the technical mode of statement is the consideration
well emphasized by the Interstate Commerce Commission, of the end-
lessness and futility of the effort to follow every transaction to its
ultimate result.... Probably in the end the public pays the damages
in most cases of compensated torts.
Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). Thus, in Darnell-Taenzer
Justice Holmes expressed the notion, later adopted by Justice White in Hanover
Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493, and in Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741, that the complica-
tions inherent in litigating pass-on issues justified a privity requirement.
Two other early cases that dealt with the pass-on issue were authored by
Justice Brandeis, who did not subscribe to Justice Holmes's rigid privity re-
quirement. In Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), a ship-
per brought an antitrust action against the defendant railroads, alleging a
conspiracy to set unreasonably high rates. Although the Court affirmed a judg-
ment against the shipper because the ICC had approved the rates as reasonable,
the opinion ended with dictum that impliedly acknowledged the pass-on defense:
"[N]o court or jury could say that, if the rate had been lower, [the plaintiff]
would have enjoyed the difference between the rates or that any other advantage
would have accrued to him. The benefit might have gone to his customers, or
conceivably to the ultimate consumer." Id. at 165.
The Court in Hanover Shoe distinguished Keogh from situations in which a
plaintiff would be free to prove an illegal overcharge because the monopolistic
prices had not been approved by a legal authority. 392 U.S. at 490 n.8. Likewise,
Justice Brandeis subsequently ignored the implications of the Keogh dictum when
the Court in Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397 (1932), again rejected the pass-on
defense. The plaintiffs in Adams were commission merchants who were engaged
in the buying and selling of livestock and who sought enforcement of an ICC
reparations order against the stockyard and railroad for excessive rates. Al-
though the merchants had recovered the overcharge from their principals, the
livestock owners-shippers, the antitrust violators could not use this fact to
limit their damage liability. Id. at 407. The remedy for the shippers to whom
the excessive rates had been passed lay in subsequent proceedings against the
commission merchants. Id. at 407-08. Thus, Justice Brandeis apparently accepted
the offensive use of pass-on theory. If applied to antitrust treble-damages ac-
tions, however, his formulation could discourage private enforcement of the
antitrust laws because plaintiffs in privity with a price-fixer might hesitate
before establishing themselves as potential defendants in subsequent suits by
their direct purchasers.
65. 431 U.S. at 741-42 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, in rejecting both the offensive and defensive use of pass-on
theory, the Court refused to require that the judiciary resolve treble-
damages distribution problems by resorting to strict economic theory,
with its necessary simplifying assumptions and statistical quantifica-
tion difficulties.
Although correct in concluding that elasticity studies cannot resolve
the pass-on problem satisfactorily, the Supreme Court unnecessarily
adopted a rule of law conflicting with section 4's mandate that anyone
injured by antitrust violations may recover treble damages. Moreover,
an absolute privity requirement's disregard of economic realities may
defeat the goals of the antitrust laws by providing a violator with the
distorted economic incentive to structure its business affairs in a
manner that insulates it from treble-damages liability. When direct
purchasers with privity resell price-fixed goods under a pre-existing,
cost-plus contract, for example, they are insulated from antitrust
injuries, and the effect of the overcharge is determined in advance.
As a result, in Hanover Shoe the Court recognized that the pass-on
defense might be permitted in such a situation. ' , Similarly, Illinois
Brick acknowledged the possible acceptability of the pass-on defense
when direct purchasers were owned or controlled by their customers.6 7
In an analogous situation, a manufacturer contemplating a course of
action potentially violative of the antitrust laws might create an
intermediate dummy firm to insulate itself from treble-damages suits.
To deter such action, a court probably would declare that the direct
66. 392 U.S. at 494. See 431 U.S. at 736.
67. 431 U.S. at 736 n.16; cf. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
Perkins involved an allegation of price discrimination in violation of § 2 (a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1970). The defendant sold gaso-
line at an illegal discount to a firm that resold the gasoline to a subsidiary. In
turn, the latter sold to one of its subsidiaries that competed with the plaintiff, a
retail service station operator. The Ninth Circuit held that, because the plaintiff
competed with a customer of a customer of a party receiving an illegal dis-
count, his injuries were "fourth level" and unprotected by the Act. Standard
Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
The Supreme Court reversed because this reasoning would permit price discrimi-
nators to avoid the sanctions of the Act merely by adding another link in the
chain of distribution. 395 U.S. at 646-48.
The Supreme Court has not determined the extent to which its holdings in
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick affect the assertion of pass-on theory in treble-
damages actions for Robinson-Patman Act violations. The result in Perkins
implicitly permitted the assertion of the pass-on offense, and the Court in
Hanover Shoe suggested that the pass-on defense appropriately might be used in
certain cases under the Robinson-Patman Act. 392 U.S. at 494 & n.10.
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purchaser was actually a "conduit" for the real purchaser, thus
creating yet another exception to the privity rule.6 8
More important than the required judicial exceptions designed to
eliminate distorted incentives, however, an inflexible. privity require-
ment may cause a sharp reduction in the deterrent effect of the treble-
damages provision in section 4. 69 Illinois Brick has excluded as treble-
damages plaintiffs many injured parties who otherwise would have
great incentive to sue. A buyer in privity with the antitrust violator,
on the other hand, may choose not to sue for a number of reasons:
fear of destroying a valuable business relationship; fear of retaliation;
indifference because of its ability to pass the overcharge to the next
level; lack of funds necessary to engage in antitrust litigation; or
aversion to the burden of proving an antitrust violation and the ex-
tent of damage suffered.70 In addition, Illinois Brick conflicts with
the Supreme Court's frequent pronouncements that the protection af-
forded by the antitrust laws should be construed liberally,71 that
antitrust enforcement via "private attorneys general" should be en-
couraged, ' and that defendants should bear the risk of uncertainty
in the measurement of damages occasioned by their unlawful actions.
7 3
Despite these countervailing policy considerations, the Court may
have justified its adoption of an artificial privity requirement on an
erroneous conclusion that simple economic techniques or theories can-
not provide guidance for the resolution of antitrust problems. At least
one such technique, however, is relevant to antitrust litigation. Stated
68. See Washington v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. Supp. 960, 961 (W.D. Wash.
1965).
69. The Court determined in Illinois Brick that the deterrent effect of § 4 is
implemented fully if some party brings suit to redress antitrust violations. See
431 U.S. at 746. In establishing the privity requirement, however, the Court
gave insufficient consideration both to the reluctance of some direct purchasers
to file suit, id., and to the tendency of a monopolistic overcharge to have cumula-
tively larger effects as it passes through the chain of production and distribution.
See notes 58-60 supra & accompanying text.
70. See 431 U.S. at 746. See also In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d
191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974) ; Schaefer, supra note
30, at 913-14.
71. Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
140 (1968) (doctrine of in pari delicto not a bar to an antitrust action) ; Rado-
vitch v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1957) (courts should
not burden private antitrust plaintiff beyond requirements established by Con-
gress); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236 (1948) (Sherman Act protects all potential victims of forbidden
practices).
72. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
73. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
123-24 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946).
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in a "quasi-general" or "other things being equal" form, economic
principles can provide direction in antitrust litigation similar to the
guidance furnished by general rules of law. Thus, economic theory
can be used to clarify issues, suggest appropriate lines of inquiry, and
provide a standard with which to evaluate the costs and benefits of
antitrust decisions.7 4 Under this rationale the theoretical extreme
pass-on cases and the four principles of elasticity can be useful in
establishing and evaluating general rules for antitrust law, even
though they cannot resolve precisely specific damages distribution
problems.7 5
The recognition of these general rules should demonstrate the incon-
sistency of an inflexible privity requirement with antitrust policy.
Because an overcharge frequently has cumulative effects as it passes
through the chain of production and distribution, the goal of compen-
sation often would be served better by preferring ultimate purchasers
as plaintiffs over prior purchasers with privity. An absolute adherence
to this policy, however, could defeat the other antitrust goals of deter-
rence, avoidance of multiple liability, and formulation of a manage-
able legal standard. Therefore, the ultimate rules of standing for
antitrust plaintiffs in pass-on cases should reflect a balancing of
economic theory and the conflicting antitrust policies.
Before Illinois Brick's establishment of the privity requirement,
various courts implicitly had employed a balancing approach when
resolving standing issues in treble-damages suits. Their decisions sug-
gest strongly that pass-on theory can aid in identifying parties injured
by antitrust violations. Clarified by an appreciation of general eco-
nomic principles, the courts' analyses provide a basis for suggesting
three situations in which standing should be granted to certain pre-
ferred plaintiffs in order to harmonize the conflicting goals of the
antitrust laws.
GENERALIZATIONS SUGGESTED BY PASS-ON LITIGATION
Products Specially Constructed and Contracted for by the Buyer
Many price-fixing cases in which pass-on issues arise concern prod-
ucts specially constructed for and contracted by the buyer. Prior to
74. Principles of oligopoly theory already have contributed to an understand-
ing of the problems accompanying enforcement of the antitrust laws. For an illu-
stration of the ongoing oligopoly theory debate compare Turner, The Definition
of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to
Deal, 75 HAav. L. REv. 655 (1962), with Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
75. For example, the first principle of elasticity, see text accompanying note
56 supra, represents the general rule that the more inelastic the demand for the
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Illinois Brick several courts had granted these buyers standing to sue
for treble damages, producing results more consistent with antitrust
policies than are possible under a privity rule. One early case in which
privity and pass-on could have been made an issue was Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta. 6 Chattanooga was a treble-
damages action by the city against two members of the Addyston Pipe
conspiracy 77 for an overcharge on iron pipe. Atlanta purchased pipe
pursuant to a contract with a third member of the conspiracy, for use
by the city in providing water service to the community. The defend-
ants, however, failed to raise the issues of privity or whether the
overcharge had been passed to the city's water customers. Despite
the city's lack of privity with the defendants,7 s the Supreme Court
permitted it to sue for treble damages because the illegal overcharge
resulting from the conspiracy injured the city financially.7 9
The pass-on issue neglected in Chattanooga subsequently was raised
by defendants in the Electrical Equipment Cases.8 0 These cases were
private treble-damages actions brought by utilities against manufac-
turers who conspired to fix the prices of electrical generators. The
affected equipment was purchased either directly by the utilities 81 or
by intermediate contractors who incorporated it in projects contracted
by the utilities.8 2 In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.,8 3 which involved direct purchases, the Seventh
Circuit precluded the defendants from asserting that the plaintiffs
final product, the more inelastic will be the demand for a component part thereof,
other things being equal.
76. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
77. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
78. Atlanta purchased the pipe from Anniston Pipe & Foundry Company, an
Alabama corporation, but brought suit against two Tennessee pipe manufacturers.
203 U.S. at 395. The defendants and Atlanta's supplier were members of the
Southern Associated Pipe Works trust during the conspiracy.
79. Id. at 396. Accord, Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 68 (1917).
80. E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203
(7th Cir. 1964); Washington v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash.
1965); Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. General Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.
Wash. 1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied per curium, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964). Over 1,800
treble-damages actions were filed from 1961 to 1963 involving substantially
similar facts and collectively referred to as the Electrical Equipment Cases. See
generally Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964).
81. E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203
(7th Cir. 1964).
82. E.g., Washington v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
83. 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964).
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had passed the overcharge to their customers.8 4 The court based its
holding in part on its prior affirmance of a district court ruling that
prevented the Illinois Attorney General from intervening on behalf of
electricity consumers.8 5 Indicating that-the consumer injury was too
remote to permit recovery, the court stated that allowing the passing-
on defense "would be tantamount to immunizing defendants from
liability." 86 In Washington v. General Electric Co.87 a private con-
tractor had incorporated the electrical equipment into a hydroelectric
project. Denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
court refused to adopt a privity rule that would have prevented the
plaintiff utility from bringing suit to redress the antitrust violation.18
The Electrical Equipment Cases illustrate the soundness of granting
standing in treble-damages suits to purchasers for whom products
have been specially cofistructed or contracted. Both theoretical and
practical reasons suggest that the contractors passed on most, if not
all, of the overcharge to the utilities. Theoretically, two of the elasticity
principles presented in the discussion of the general case support this
conclusion.8 9 Because generators are an indispensible component of
an electric power project, their demand is highly inelastic. Addi-
tionally, because the demand for the residential use of electricity is
relatively inelastic, 90 the demand for generators, a necessary com-
ponent for the production of electrical power, also is inelastic.
From a practical standpoint, as one district court noted, "every
84. Id. at 208-09.
85. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th
Cir. 1963), aff'g 207 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
86. 335 F.2d at 208. See also City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
308 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963), in which the
court prevented the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission from intervening on
behalf of electricity consumers. Id. at 860-61. The court correctly refused to
grant standing to electricity consumers. To the extent that state regulatory
commissions reduced the rate base of each utility to reflect its antitrust re-
coveries, the overcharge was not passed to consumers. See Note, The Pass-On
Defense in Regulated Public Utilities, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1113, 1131 (1962). The
University of Pennsylvania Law Review mailed a questionnaire to each state's
utility regulating agency. The twenty-two responding agencies agreed that a
utility recovering treble damages for an equipment overcharge would be re-
quired to reduce the carrying value of those assets by the amount of the re-
covery. Id. Even if the rate bases had not been reduced, consumer class actions
are inappropriate when the antitrust violations occur beneath the level of the
final product. See text accompanying notes 120-21 infra.
87. 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
88. Id. at 962.
89. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
90. See C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 28-30, 304-05 (1969); C.
WILcox & W. SHEPARD, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 410-11 (5th ed. 1975).
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manufacturer of goods and services attempts to take into account
the cost of equipment and raw materials he buys in setting the price
at which he sells his product and, to the extent he succeeds, such costs
are passed on." 91 More importantly, in situations when the utility
was not a direct purchaser from the generator manufacturer, it had
no business relationship to protect, it had no reason to fear retaliation,
and it usually could bear the costs and risks of litigation better than
the general contractors.
Other cases also provide support for the conclusion that purchasers
of specially constructed or contracted products should be granted
standing to sue for treble damages. In Armco Steel Corp. v. North
Dakota,9 2 for example, the defendant steel corporation entered into a
conspiracy with three of its distributors to fix the prices of corrugated
culverts, structural platepipes, and metal end sections used in highway
construction. The products were either purchased directly by the
state or included in highway construction projects by private con-
tractors; 93 nevertheless, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's damage award providing recovery for both situations. 94 Despite
the state's lack of privity as to all the purchases, the illegal price had
been quoted to the private contractors for use in the bids they sub-
mitted to the state. Consequently, any overcharge by the manufacturer
necessarily was included in the contract prices of the highway projects
performed by private builders.9 5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a result con-
sistent with Armco in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases.16 In that
case manufacturers of liquid asphalt engaged in a conspiracy to fix
the price of asphalt sold to contractors who used it in combination
91. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
92. 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967).
93. Id. at 208.
94. Id. at 212.
95. Id. at 210-11. Cf. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 438 F.2d 1380
(8th Cir. 1971), in which the defendant steel fabricators fixed the price of
structural steel that was sold to general contractors and incorporated into road
projects built for the state. The defendants' interrogatory inquired whether any
overcharge paid by the state was passed to the federal government, which
financed up to 90% of the projects' cost. Although the court required an answer
to the interrogatory, it noted that the question's relevance depended on whether
the increased cost to the contractors had been passed to the state. Id. at 1383-85.
96. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). Cf.
Standard Indus., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 829 (1973) (lower court did not err in permitting jury to
consider pass-on defense against general contractor of asphalt roads; neverthe-
less, the jury found that defendant had not proved its case).
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with other ingredients to construct public roads for various states. 7
Although the district court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment because the plaintiff states lacked privity,9 the Ninth
Circuit reversed,99 noting that the likelihood of a suit by the con-
tractors was remote and that the states should be permitted to prove
their injuries caused by the overcharge. 0 0
Thus, prior to Illinois Brick several courts sensibly had concluded
that purchasers of specially constructed or contracted products should
be permitted to sue component manufacturers for antitrust violations,
regardless of privity. As the analysis of the Electrical Equipment
Cases demonstrates, these decisions attempted to balance the conflict-
ing goals of the antitrust laws. The courts not only identified those
parties most probably injured by the antitrust violations but also
granted standing to the plaintiffs with the greatest incentive to bring
treble-damages suits. In Illinois Brick, on the other hand, the plain-
tiffs, as purchasers of specially constructed and contracted buildings,
sought to recover treble damages from manufacturers of concrete
block, a component part of the final product. Inasmuch as these
plaintiffs were the most appropriate parties to bring suit, the Supreme
Court's holding failed to harmonize the conflicting antitrust policies:
its adoption of an artificial privity rule undermined the goals of com-
pensation and deterrence. Hereafter, a purchaser of a specially con-
structed or contracted product may not redress an illegal overcharge
by a component manufacturer unless he has privity with the violator,
an issue that many lower courts previously had recognized as irrele-
vant.
Price-Fixing At or Above the Final Product Level of Mass-Produced
Goods
Principles of economics indicate that when price-fixing occurs at or
above the level of the final product in the ascending vertical chain
of production and distribution of mass-produced goods, ultimate con-
sumers probably will suffer the greatest injury from the illegal over-
charge. For example, the supply curves of multiproduct distributors
generally are highly elastic; 101 therefore, as Case 1B demonstrated
above, these distributors will pass-on most of the overcharge. 02 Ac-
97. 487 F.2d at 194-95.
98. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 350 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
99. 487 F.2d at 201.
100. Id. at 197-99.
101. See C. SHOUP, supTra note 51, at 274-75; Schaefer, supra note 30, at 918-20.
102. See note 53 supra & accompanying text. In addition, Case 1A shows that,
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cordingly, most wholesalers and retailers of mass-produced goods are
inappropriate treble-damages plaintiffs, despite their privity with the
price fixers, and a legislative preference should grant standing to
institutional consumers and states. As an antitrust plaintiff, a state
could bring an action either as a representative of the class of con-
sumers within its borders or as parens patriae.
Some courts have recognized that wholesalers and retailers who
pass-on illegal overcharges have no valid claim to an antitrust recov-
ery. In the Oil Jobber Cases,10 3 for example, the plaintiffs, wholesalers
of petroleum products, had privity with the defendant oil refiners. The
plaintiffs' profit margins, however, were guaranteed in contracts with
the defendants; many plaintiffs actually paid wholesale prices tied to
the retail prices of gasoline. 10 4 In this context the courts accepted the
pass-on defense because the plaintiffs were unable to prove injury. 0 5
A similar result obtained in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,' ° 6
a complex multidistrict combination of sixty-six civil suits alleging
that final product manufacturers violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act in the sale of broad spectrum antibiotic drugs. Among
the plaintiffs were various state and local governments, wholesale and
retail druggists, institutional consumers such as private hospitals
and Blue Cross, and purchasers of antibiotics for non-human purposes.
The defendant manufacturer offered $100 million to settle all claims,
and the dispute centered on the appropriate distribution of damages.
To resolve this issue, the federal district court divided the plaintiffs
into two classes: the first, which consisted of state and local govern-
ments and their agencies with claims arising from direct purchases or
welfare payments, was awarded $60 million; the second class, which
consisted of wholesalers, retailers, and individual consumers, including
to the extent consumer demand for a commodity is inelastic, total pass-on
occurs. Id.
103. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil
Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941);
Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942).
104. See, e.g., Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967,
969 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944). See also Obron v. Union
Camp Corp., 477 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973) (pass-on defense permitted against a
wholesale distributor who paid manufacturer's list price less 5% but who billed
retail customers at manufacturer's list price, thus providing himself with a
guaranteed profit margin).
105. See cases cited note 103 supra.
106. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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claims of states as parens patriae on behalf of their citizens, was
awarded the remaining $40 million. The trial court approved the
settlement, which provided that of the $40 million due the second
class only $3 million would be allocated to wholesalers and retailers
as a "nuisance value" and the remainder would be awarded to indi-
vidual consumers.'07 As direct purchasers the wholesalers maintained
that under Hanover Shoe they were entitled to the entire $40 million.
The court rejected their claim, however, in part because they sold on
a cost-plus basis and in part because of the uncertainty in the law after
Hanover Shoe. 08
The results in the Oil Jobber Cases and in Chas. Pfizer clearly com-
port with practical considerations of antitrust enforcement. A recent
study of antitrust actions brought by the government indicates that
consumers purchase many items such as bread, dairy products, meat,
eggs, and produce, only after those goods have passed through several
vertical levels in the chain of distribution.0 9 If a price-fixing con-
spiracy occurs either among manufacturers or wholesalers of a final
mass-produced commodity, the privity rule permits the violators to
insulate themselves with subsequent distributors from treble-damages
suits by ultimate consumers who are most likely to be injured and
have an incentive to sue. Wholesalers may be reluctant to sue manu-
facturers because they hope to maintain business relationships, they
lack the financial ability to proceed with a major lawsuit, or they
desire to avoid other risks of litigation. Although similar considera-
tions will discourage retailers from suing wholesalers, the size and
market power of some chain companies may palliate their natural
aversion to seeking an antitrust remedy.
Nevertheless, the problem remains of identifying the most effective
plaintiff to protect ultimate consumers' interests when price fixing
occurs at or above the final product level of mass-produced goods. If
retailers and wholesalers are disqualified from bringing treble-
damages suits when price fixing occurs at or above the final product
level of mass-produced goods, then consumers must be granted stand-
ing to fill the void in antitrust enforcement. In support of the con-
clusion that the ultimate consumers would be the most effective
plaintiffs in these situations, economic theory suggests that the
cumulative effects of a monopolistic overcharge passing through the
chain of distribution cause the greatest injury to ultimate consumers.
Preferred standing for consumers nevertheless poses many prac-
tical obstacles to effective antitrust enforcement. Generally, most con-
107. Id. at 728.
108. Id. at 745-46.
109. Handler & Blechman, supra note 36, at 637.
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sumers have too small an interest to file an individual antitrust suit.
An exception to this observation, however, exists for institutional
consumers, such as hospitals, Blue Cross, and state and local govern-
ments, that suffer substantial injury as a consequence of their volume
purchasing. These consumers should be granted standing regardless
of their lack of privity with defendants. In other situations, class
action suits could provide a vehicle for individual consumers to pool
their claims in a single suit and to seek recovery for their aggregated
injuries. Three mechanisms presently exist for representing con-
sumers in these contexts: individual consumer class actions, class
actions brought by states as representatives of similarly situated con-
sumers within its borders, and parens patriae actions brought by
states on behalf of their resident consumers. Of these options the
latter two are preferable to individual consumer class actions.
The distribution of damages to a class containing large numbers of
unidentified members creates a major obstacle to effective consumer
class actions. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,110 for example, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that a class action could not be maintained on behalf
of six million persons, of whom only two million were identifiable, be-
cause it was unmanageable.' Similarly, in Donson Stores v. Ameri-
can Bakeries Co.1 1 2 the representatives of a putative class of twenty
million consumers sought to intervene in a treble-damages action
brought by retail grocery stores against baking companies for price-
fixing. The court, rejecting the would-be consumer representatives'
contention that the illegal overcharge had been passed to the ultimate
buyers, relied on Hanover Shoe's implication that only direct pur-
chasers could bring antitrust treble-damages suits.""
110. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
111. Id. at 1016-17. The court noted, however, that the pressures created by
preliminary procedures, including the mini-hearing on the merits and the im-
mense expense of complying with discovery orders, have induced defendants to
offer large settlements in many cases. Id. at 1019. Nevertheless, the court further
recognized that "not a single one of these class actions including millions of in-
discriminate and unidentifiable members has ever been brought to trial and de-
cided on the merits." Id. at 1018-19. See also Handler & Blechman, supra note 36,
at 628 n.14.
In Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973), an auto-
mobile purchaser sued General Motors, alleging that the latter overcharged its
dealers due to its monopoly power and that the dealers, in turn, passed the
overcharge to him and 30 to 40 million other buyers. The court decided that the
purchaser could use the pass-on concept offensively, id. at 598-99, but denied his
motion to maintain the suit as a class action. Id. at 602.
112. 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
113. Id. at 483-85.
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The inherent unmanageability of consumer class actions is mini-
mized when a state, suing on its behalf and for its political subdi-
visions, seeks to proceed as class representative of similarly-situated
consumers within its borders.1 14 Federal courts can permit states to
recover as class representatives for all resident consumers, can require
that treble-damages awards be distributed to individuals with specific
claims, and should authorize the states to retain any unclaimed portion
of the award as general revenues. This was the result in the Chas.
Pfizer settlement." 5
The third mechanism for consumer representation in a treble-
damages suit against final product manufacturers is a parens patriae
action pursuant to the newly-enacted section 4C of the Clayton Act." 6
Prior to the enactment of section 4C, the Supreme Court in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co." 7 had rejected a parens patriae suit to recover treble
damages for injury to the state's general economy.11 Now, although a
114. See, e.g., Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(per curiam) ; In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267, 278, 296
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
115. See 440 F.2d at 1084.
116. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(a) (Supp. 1977). Section 4C was created by the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, Title III,
§ 301, 90 Stat. 1394. This section provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in
the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural
persons residing in such State, in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure monetary
relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by such
natural persons to their property by reason of any violation of the
Sherman Act. The court shall exclude from the amount of monetary
relief awarded in such action any amount of monetary relief (A)
which duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the same
injury, or (B) which is properly allocable to (i) natural persons
who have excluded their claims pursuant to subsection (b) (2) of
this section, and (ii) any business entity.
(2) The court shall award the State as monetary relief threefold
the total damage sustained as described in paragraph (1) of this
subsection, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
117. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
118. Id. at 253. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), the
Supreme Court permitted Georgia to sue as parens patriae for injunctive relief
under the antitrust laws, id. at 446-47, but in Hawaii the Court noted that this
did not authorize suits to recover damages for injury to the state's general
economy. 405 U.S. at 260. For favorable comment on parens patriae actions see
Oliff, Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions for Treble Damages, 14 HARV. J. LEG.
328, 356 (1977); Note, The Proposed Antitrust Parens Patriae Act: Overdue
Antitrust Relief for Ultimate Consumers, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 219 (1976). Pro-
fessor Handler, a critic of collective consumer actions, see Handler, The Shift
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state may have suffered no injury from an antitrust violation, it may
bring a treble-damages suit as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens
to recover for any injuries sustained by them. The court can direct
that recoveries by the state be distributed to specific claimants or re-
tained as general revenues." 9
With Congress's statutory approval of some parens patriae actions,
the remaining obstacle to their effective use is the Supreme Court's re-
jection in Illinois Brick of offensive pass-on theory. Illinois Brick
diminished the utility not only of parens patriae suits but also of other
types of consumer actions. Unless consumers have privity with anti-
trust violators, they will be unable to recover treble damages. Ex-
perience and economic theory have demonstrated, however, that when
price-fixing occurs at or above the final product level of mass-
produced goods, distributors often may hesitate to instigate treble-
damages suits. Consequently, a denial of standing to consumers in
these situations removes much of the deterrent effect of the treble-
damages provision and inadequately balances the policies reflected in
the antitrust statutes.
Price-Fixing by Manufacturers of Mass-Produced Goods Below the
Level of the Final Product
When price-fixing occurs in the vertical chain of production of
mass-produced goods below the level of the final product, standing to
sue for treble damages should be granted to the manufacturers of the
final product, regardless of privity. This rule also attempts to accom-
modate practical considerations of antitrust enforcement with general
principles of economic theory. It grants standing to the parties who
are most likely to be injured and who have the greatest incentive to
sue.
When the manufacturers of a minor component of a mass-produced
item conspire to fix prices, the resultant injury generally affects
consumers only indirectly.1 20 Moreover, to the extent that the over-
charge for a component accounts for only a small percentage of the
final product's cost, most consumers lack a sufficient interest to file
an individual suit. These consumers theoretically could be represented
From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9-10; Handler, Twenty-
Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 34-42 (1972), recommends
that the Department of Justice be empowered to bring a form of parens patriae
action. See Handler & Blechman, supra note 35, at 674-76.
119. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c (Supp. 1977).
120. Cf. Handler & Blechman, supra note 35, at 636-38. See also Posner, A
Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 409 (1970).
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either in a class action or in a parens patriae suit, as in a situation in-
volving price-fixing at or above the level of the final product. Unlike
the latter situation, however, if the violation occurs below the level of
the final product, the final product manufacturer would be a more
suitable antitrust plaintiff than the ultimate consumers.
Preferring final product manufacturers over ultimate consumers as
treble-damages plaintiffs would avoid both the unnecessary complexi-
ties of class action litigation and difficult questions of damages distri-
bution. Unlike intermediate manufacturers, final product manufac-
turers would not be reluctant to sue the antitrust violators. They
generally could finance the litigation more easily and would have less
fear of disrupting business relations. More importantly, the principles
of elasticity suggest that a monopolistic overcharge for a component
product often will be passed at least to the manufacturer of the final
product. 12 1 For example, the demand will be inelastic for a component
whose cost is a relatively minor part of the cost of the final mass-pro-
duced good; virtually all of a monopolistic overcharge by that com-
ponent's manufacturer will be passed through intermediate purchasers
to the final product manufacturer. Thus, deterrence and compensation
also are served best by a grant of standing to the final product manu-
facturer.
An analysis of cases involving these circumstances further demon-
strates the preferability of this rule to the privity requirement estab-
lished in Illinois Brick. In Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Manufactur-
ing Corp., 22 for example, four manufacturers of clothing, plastic bags,
and carryalls filed a class action to recover treble damages for injuries
resulting from a price-fixing conspiracy among zipper slider manufac-
turers. The latter group sold sliders to zipper manufacturers which in
turn sold zippers to the plaintiffs. Denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the district court concluded that Hanover Shoe prohibited
only the defensive use of pass-on theory.1 23 It also rejected the argu-
ment that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were outside the
target area of the defendants' alleged violations.1'2 4 Thus, the court's
decision granted final product manufacturers the opportunity to prove
their losses caused by the antitrust violations of component part manu-
facturers.125
121. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
122. 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
123. Id. at 291.
124. Id. at 292-94.
125. Id. at 294. An earlier case reaching a different result 'was Wolfe v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955), in
whiqh paint manufacturers sued the manufacturers of titanium pigment, a
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A failure to follow the proposed rule could defeat several policies
of the antitrust laws. A privity requirement could frustrate the goal
of compensation and deterrence. A perfunctory elimination of the
privity rule, however, could defeat the goals of defining a manageable
legal standard and of avoiding either multiple liability or the un-
warranted use of the pass-on defense. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has dealt with the latter problems unsuccessfully. In
Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,12 a suit
was brought to recover damages caused by an antitrust violation re-
sulting in an overcharge of $10 to $20 for plumbing fixtures that were
used in buildings selling for as much as $30,000. The vertical chain
of production and distribution extended from plumbing fixture manu-
facturers through wholesalers, plumbing contractors, and general
contractors to either the first or, in some instances, the second
owners of home, apartment, and commercial buildings. Although
the Third Circuit held that Hanover Shoe required dismissal
as to the owner plaintiffs because of the insuperable burden of
proving that the overcharge was passed to them, 127 it also doubted that
the price of a house would be influenced by the small amount of the
overcharges. 12 8 Nevertheless, the court later affirmed a settlement ap-
component of their paint, for fixing prices and allocating amounts purchaseable
by paint manufacturers. Because the defendant's quota system gave preferential
treatment to the plaintiff, however, the paint manufacturers could not demon-
strate injury. As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.
Id. at 434. Relying on the Oil Jobber Cases, the court's opinion suggested that
the plaintiffs must bear the burden of proving not only that the competitive
price would have been lower than the fixed price, id. at 432-33, but also that
they did not pass the overcharge to their customers. Id. The plaintiffs failed to
meet both burdens. The suggestions presented in this Article, however, indicate
that the cases should have been distinguished. In Wolfe, the antitrust violation
occurred below the level of the final product; standing to sue should have been
granted to the final product manufacturer. A presumption that the overcharge
was passed-on therefore was inappropriate. In the Oil Jobber Cases, the antitrust
violators were the final product manufacturers; the courts correctly sustained
the defensive use of pass-on theory against the plaintiff wholesalers.
126. 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g per curiam, Philadelphia Hous. Auth.
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
127. 438 F.2d at 1188. Cf. Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Products Corp.,
1972 Trade Cas. 74,235 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (heating contractors and builder
owners denied standing to sue gas vent pipe manufacturers for price fixing;
Hanover Shoe required privity between plaintiffs and defendants). But see In re
Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973),
appeal dismissed, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,648 (2d Cir. 1975) (states, cities, builder-
owners, and private owners who bought hardware indirectly from price-fixing
manufacturers had standing to sue: Hanover Shoe's rejection of passing-on
defense did not extend to its offensive use).
128. 438 F.2d at 1188.
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proved by the district court, despite the objection of some contractors
that they did not receive adequate damages. 121 The appellate court re-
jected the contractors' contention in part because they probably had
passed the overcharge to the building owners.130 Thus, the court per-
mitted the defendants to use the pass-on concept against both groups
of plaintiffs.
In some situations, homes, apartments, and buildings should be
characterized as specially constructed and contracted products. Never-
theless, when a tract builder constructs several hundred houses, the
buildings are similar to mass-produced products. In Mangano, in
which some individual claims were quite small, the court was correct
in refusing standing to individual home owners.
CONCLUSION
Congress probably will repeal legislatively the absolute privity re-
quirement established by the Court in Illinois Brick. 3 ' A perfunctory
reversal, however, would aggravate the problems of multiple liability,
129. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir.
1971), aff'g Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 322 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
130. Id.
131. Currently, five proposals designed to overrule Illinois Brick are under
consideration by the Congress. The first bill introduced for this purpose, H.R.
7788, would amend § 4 of the Clayton Act to permit recovery by a purchaser
"without regard to whether or not such person was injured as a result of a direct
contract or agreement with the defendant." H.R. 7788, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
Two proposals, H.R. 8359 and S. 1874, were identical bills introduced in the
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly and the House Subcommittee on
Monopolies and Commercial Law by their respective chairmen, Senator Edward
M. Kennedy and Representative Peter W. Rodino. These bills would amend § 4 of
the Clayton Act to permit a suit by any person who suffered injury "in fact,"
whether "directly or indirectly." H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ; S.
1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See 823 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
A-4. After hearings, a revised draft bill was reported by the Senate subcommittee
to the full Senate Committee on the Judiciary without recommendation. This
revised draft amends § 4 to permit both offensive and defensive assertions of
passing-on regardless of privity. The revision also precludes class actions on
behalf of natural persons who have not dealt directly with the defendant, with
the exception of state parens patriae actions. See 847 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) A-3.
Another proposal, H.R. 10783, was introduced by Representative John F.
Seiberling. This bill amends § 4 to read: "Any person including any indirect
purchaser . . . may sue . . . ." It neither provides for a defensive assertion of
passing-on nor limits class actions, but rather permits transfer and consolidation
of § 4 suits. H.R. 10783, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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damages distribution, and formulation of a manageable legal standard
that prompted the Court to grant standing only to those plaintiffs in
privity with the antitrust violator.132 These problems were far from
illusory, and their accommodation with the goals of compensation and
deterrence can be achieved only by identifying and preferring the
most appropriate antitrust plaintiffs, as in the three situations dis-
cussed in this Article. This balancing process is a legislative task that
Congress successfully can complete by considering both economic
theory and the practical aspects of antitrust enforcement.
132. 431 U.S. at 730, 737-41.
